Since its inception in 1888, the Gifford Lectures have established its name as a champion of excellence in research and promoter of philosophical discourse. The lectures are hosted by four Scottish universities – Aberdeen. Edinburgh, Glasgow and St. Andrews – following the will of Adam Lord Gifford, the originator of the lectures. Many an illustrious name – William James, Hannah Arendt, Alfred North Whitehead, Jurgen Moltmann, Etienne Gilson and Henri Bergson to name a few – have taken part in this intellectual fest and a number of valuable publications have issued out of the scholarly discourses. Lord Gifford made an initial endowment of £80,000 as a seed fund for what would be carried on as a tradition of public lectures on the appointed theme of natural theology. Gifford and his colleagues, staunch disciples of the legacy of Enlightenment, wanted to secure reason in its primacy in all the frontiers of human enquiry including what could be the highest object of man’s intellectual pursuit, God. Natural theology is distinguished from revealed theology which presupposes the existence of God based on the data provided by the divine revelation. Macintyre’s book, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, is the text of his own Gifford lecture delivered at the Edinburgh University in April and May 1988. It also represents the third part of the triptych which included two other earlier works, After Virtue (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) where MacIntyre laid down his critique of the crisis that plagues contemporary moral enquiry and his argument for a remedy that he found in Thomistic Aristotelianism. The term is not a romantic invocation to justify the revival of a bygone hybrid tradition. What MacIntyre did in his lecture was to problematize the tradition which the Gifford Lectures themselves represent and pointed out its inadequacies as a form of moral enquiry. He called such tradition Encyclopedia, an intellectual movement which traced its origin to the birth of the first encyclopedia produced by Diderot and D’Alembert in the 18th century and whose influence extended up to the heyday of the 19th century, culminating in the publication of the pivotal Ninth Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica whose moral position Lord Adam Gifford and his confreres proudly endorsed. The encyclopedists were sons of the Enlightenment and were firm in their belief in a single, universal rationality that serves as a standard for all cultures and all moral questions. At the other end of the debate is yet another movement which MacIntyre called Genealogy, represented by Nietzsche and his disciples, Foucault and Deleuze. The primary text that contained the genealogists ethical position was no other than Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der Moral and their basic presupposition was the complete abandonment of everything the Encyclopedia movement held dear. Nietzsche did not only reject academic lecture and systematization of knowledge as a form of discourse; he outrightly threw out of the window any talk about of ethical standards, claims to truth and rationality. The two movements, therefore, represented, two extreme positions of the modern moral debate: the Encyclopedia with its dogmatic patronage of a unitary and universal rational standard and the Genealogy with its warrant for freedom any rational or moral standard. The two movements were saddled by what MacIntyre termed as the problems of incommensurability and untranslability. Moral theorists were divided between their competing claims but they were helpless in the absence of common standards that can be utilized to evaluate them. The positions they made and the problems they raised seemed to be perpetually open-ended. This is where MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelianism comes in. Thomistic Aristotelianism speaks of a tradition which provides the absent context and the evaluative standards which can measure the claims of encyclopedists and genealogists. MacIntyre called the third movement Tradition, which is an admixture of the philosophical theology of Aquinas, the ethics of Aristotle and inputs from the political theory of Marx. It is Tradition, according to MacIntyre, which will bridge the impasse between the rival moral theories of Encyclopedia and Genealogy and what will make the conversation between them possible. It is also for the same reason why MacIntyre believes that Thomistic Aristotelianism as a form of critique is not only necessary but also indispensable.
As it evolves from its Greek origin, philosophy assumes a variety of forms throughout history. These varieties of philosophy are what other textbooks call branches or kinds of philosophy. For our purpose, we prefer to call them versions of philosophy. There is only one love of wisdom but there could be different ways by which the same philosophy expresses itself in different ages and cultures. Even authors vary in the way they present philosophy in its different forms. Sometimes it is labeled according to the nationality or geographical location of certain philosophers (German philosophy, French philosophy, British philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, Continental philosophy) or according to an identification with a particular period of history (ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, renaissance philosophy, modern philosophy) or according to affinity with a religious thought (Islamic philosophy, Jewish philosophy, Christian philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, Daoist philosophy). Philosophy is also identified following the name of the philosopher which espoused a certain system of thought (Thomistic philosophy after Thomas Aquinas; Cartesian philosophy after Rene Descartes; Kantian philosophy after Immanuel Kant; Hegelian philosophy after George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Marxist philosophy after Karl Marx among others). It is also common to name philosophy according to different schools of thought which embody the spirit of the times of different epochs (skepticism, scholasticism, idealism, rationalism, romanticism, materialism, existentialism, modernism, structuralism). Philosophy also sometimes adopts the name of the method or tool it uses as in the case of logic, hermeneutics or analytic philosophy. The most familiar of all philosophy’s names is taken after the subject matter it covers. Among the popular ones, we have epistemology if it concerns the question of the validity of knowledge; ontology if it concerns the question of the basis of reality; ethics if it concerns the question concerning the basis of human action; aesthetics if it concerns the question concerning the criteria of beauty. When it comes to the question of divinity, philosophy resorts to theodicy or if we turn to politics, we have political philosophy; for issues that concern fundamental questions related to our humanity, we have the philosophy of the human person. Lately, we one can also hear of philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics. In other schools here and abroad, one may also find courses on applied philosophy like environmental ethics, business ethics and philosophy of technology.
As one can see, philosophy excludes nothing in its purview. Philosophy practically embraces the entire landscape of reality. Those who think of philosophy as a stand-alone discipline is gravely mistaken for philosophy’s real worth lies precisely in its ability to embed in other the disciplines the spirit of self-critique and rigorous inquiry. We do not philosophize if we merely subscribe to a particular philosophical doctrine or make ourselves blind disciples of this or that philosopher or worse, if we think and write as though philosophy will cure the ills of the world. The point of discussing the different versions of philosophy is for us to see the range of philosophy’s critical enterprise. Philosophy has this distinct capacity to push the boundaries of its scope as wide as possible not so much by providing answers to all possible questions but by posing questions which enable it to establish “bridges”, to use the expression of Deleuze, with other disciplines. When philosophy dips its finger into seemingly alien frontiers like economics, quantum physics or biotechnology, it is actually engaging them in a kind of a critical interface in order to bring to the attention of the experts our human concerns. What appears like an interference is actually a necessary engagement which philosophy undertakes as a critical discipline. Philosophy does not compete with other fields of inquiry but puts itself at their service.
This is also the same spirit that we imbibe from studying philosophy. Philosophy introduces us to an interpretive life and makes more intense our yearning for wisdom by inspiring and teaching us first of all to ask questions. A student of philosophy is a pilgrim and the questions he makes help him identify the landmarks in his map. A question is the first step towards understanding. It creates the space and sets the condition of possibility for the construction of new meanings. It likewise opens up our sight to the multiplicity of alternative perspectives. To live therefore an examined or interpreted life which philosophy offers us is to live a meaningful life. It is to find the world and know it as if we see it for the first time. We no longer look around us and see a world surrounded by dull figures and bland tones but trees, flowers, sunlight, air, raindrops which speak to us and out of whose language we are able to create meanings that make our lives worth living. With philosophy, we no longer live inside the cave described by Plato. We become men and women of light, freed from the cave walls where the only images we see are shadows.
Imagine coming to a cinema halfway through the featured film, at the time when the climax of the story has started to build up, the identities of the characters have unraveled and the anticipation of the audience has mounted to another level. It is still possible to feel excitement in this situation but the excitement has to compete with a thousand and one questions that whirl in our mind. That is the price of coming late for a movie date. When we miss a substantial part of the movie’s preliminaries, we are bound to experience a kind of vacuum within and this can easily distract us from the movie’s narrative or cinematic effects.
In our age however, this minor inconvenience can easily be remedied. Most movies shown in theatres are preceded by comprehensive reviews long before their debut. In other words, when a cineaste visits a movie house, she is already loaded with substantial information about the movie she wants to see. She might have read something from blogs or heard comments from talk shows or have browsed the movie’s book version. If she fails to do any of this, she can wait for the next screening and then tie up the loose ends once the movie starts again. Besides, most people these days no longer go to the cinema to watch a movie. Movies today are either downloaded or burned and they are shown, no longer in huge cinema halls, but in offices, bedroom, waiting lounges, public transportations, practically any place where we can safely hold our gadgets where the movies are stored as files.
There is no shortage of options as long as the topic is confined to missing the beginning of a movie. I guess it won’t be as easy once the issue shifts to life itself, how it began and how much we do not know about it. As in the example given, we came to life in midstream. Events have taken place and episodes have transpired long before we barged into the scene. History is past precisely because it is always ahead of us. Like our tardy moviegoer, our advent to life is the entry of someone who is late for the screening. That explains why human existence is marked by so many unknowns. This partial blindness to basic truths about life gives occasion to uncertainty but still, others take it as a motivation to journey and to search.
In the beginning of human civilization, our ancestors mitigate this problem of human condition by seeking recourse to religion, rituals, mysticism and superstition. They drew assurance and consolation from the latter to sustain them through a life marred by instability and doubt. From them, they derive answers that are ready-made and repeatable. When we are dealing with something greater than ourselves, we often look for a north to give us constancy of direction. In the old days, religion, ritual, mysticism and superstition perform that function. Then at one point, somewhere in ancient Greece, a group of people thought that maybe there is more to reality than what is prescribed by the oracle and the pronouncements of the gods. There might be, they thought, a way of seeing life other than what is purported by the temple keepers and the worship leaders. Rather than relying on their word, these new breed of seekers started taking nature as it is – courting it, coaxing it to reveal its riches and secrets. For this reason, these early thinkers are called sometimes as the first natural scientists because of their efforts to understand nature in its own terms. Their names, literally and otherwise, are indeed Greek – Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander among others. They were collectively referred to by scholars as the Milesians. Their goal was to determine the primary stuff that underlies reality. They came up with different theories. Thales thought it was water. Anaximenes thought it was air. For Anaximander, it was something undefinable. Despite their differences, they were in agreement that a new and different way of looking at the world is possible. They were breaking new grounds though unaware that they were laying the ground for a discourse which will be later known as philosophy.
We remember the ancients because they remind us of philosophy’s origin. While it can be said that philosophy historically began from Greece at around 6th century BC, it is also true that its being historical does not only mean it originated from the past; it also means its origin stems from our human nature to seek an alternative way of looking at the world. Philosophy therefore has no fixed and single history because it always begins, even today, even from us, every time we venture to search for a way of looking at life differently.
(The following is an excerpt of a longer article entitled “Re-reading Filipino Philosophy with Gilles Deleuze.”)
If Filipino philosophy means articulation of native thought, doubtless we say that Filipino philosophy has existed long ago. What renders this proposition problematic however is the inherent ambivalence in the notion of the “native” itself. At the turn of the 19th century, as the world was undergoing massive geopolitical shift and the Philippines’ was embroiled in its own struggle for sovereignty, one person attempted to define his own concept of the native. He was Jose Rizal. In order to undertake his project of recuperating the meaning of the native, Rizal turned to the Antonio de Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas. de Morga was a Spanish lawyer and was the lieutenat governor in the Philippines from 1595-1603. What he had to say, Rizal thought, deserved his readers’ serious attention since he “governed the destinies of the Philippines in the beginning of her new era and witnessed the last moments of our ancient nationality. In his introduction to the book, Rizal appealed to his fellow Filipinos’ “consciousness of the past, already effaced from your memory.” The past Rizal was alluding to was the Philippines’ prehistory which he reconstructed from the reportage of de Morga. In Rizal’s fictive and romantic history, the Philippines had an authentic Malayan and Asian past, an established culture and a precolonial nationality. All these however floundered with the coming of European modernity. Rizal’s de Morga annotation was desribed by the Philippine culture scholar Resil Mojares as a “nationalist counternarrative.” As he explained: “Rizal’s decision to annotate Morga was not merely dictated by expedience but the discursive formation in which the nationalists operated. They had to speak to, through, and against the European texts that had – by now they represented the past, present, and future of the country – ‘produced a Philippines that the Filipino nationalists now desired to fashion as their own.” While Rizal’s work was read more as a fictive rather than a historical narrative even during his time, it did however succeed in convincing his contemporaries as well as the reader of the succeeding generations that such pristine, native Filipino culture was possible. Rizal’s legacy of nationalism would prove to be dominantly influential among scholars across different historical periods and and across a varierty of disciplines. With the resurgence of nationalism prior to and during the heyday of Martial Law, philosophy too would lean towards the nationalist discourse. It is within this context that one may read exponents of Filipino philosophy like Emerita Quito, Claro Ceniza, Leonardo Mercado and Florentino Timbreza. The works they did were an attempt to bring Filipino philosophy closer to the philosophy we knew from the West and the same time highlight what is a typically Filipino native thought. As noted by Mercado in his apologia: “All movements are based on a philosophy which bullets cannot destroy. In the growing clamor for Filipino self-identity is implied the need for clarifying what Filipino thought is. Colonial powers have ruled the Filipinos for the past centuries and in doing so imposed their own ideologies on the people. Intellectual colonialism is like a process of condiitioning; it induces a person to forget his own culture and eventually makes him ape a superior model…In short, the Filipino needs a philosophy to explain and support his identity.”
While laudable in their own rights and for what they intended to achieve, it is difficult to see how Filipino philosophy as conceived by the above-mentioned thinkers would advance given its entanglement with the problematic of identity which as pointed out above was something which Rizal in his annotation of Morga merely posited but left unchallenged. Rizal thought of identity in metaphysical, essentialist terms. Identity to him was something pre-given and something which can be lost and regained through a narrative return. The campaign for Filipino philosophy is an extension of such project. Our local gurus could not be blamed after all for their short sight for the problem was not their handiwork but was merely handed down by a tradition of nationalist narrative steeped in fictive history and romanticism. Rizal himself, for all his genius, would not have subjected what he was writing to a self-critique aware as he was that what he was writing was not a philosophical piece but a work of propaganda meant as a counterpoint to the caricaturist perception of Spain about the Philippines. He would not have been aware that both identity and alterity are products of hegemony of European modernity. In the words of Hardt and Negri: “Colonialism and racial subordination function as a temporary solution to the crisis of European modernity, not only in economic and political terms, but also in terms of identity and culture. Colonialism constructs figures of alterity and manages their flows in what unfolds as a complex dialectical structure. The negative construction of non-European others is finally what founds and sustains European identity itself.” This is a classic case of eternal return where one sees the predominance of reactive forces over the active forces and the perpetuation of the hegemony of the Same. The more Filipino philosophy persists in its recovery of a lost identity, the deeper it gets stuck in such quandary. In order to find its voice, Filipino philosophy must strive to assert its will to power. This happens when the negation brought about by the initial triumph of the reactives forces is itself negated (the negation of the negation) and the reactive forces themselves are dissipated in the process Nietzsche called “active destruction” – the event when negation is transmuted to affirmation. It is through this that eternal return can lead the becoming of the active forces which Nietzsche and Deleuze described as the “eternal joy of becoming.” As a first step towards this goal, Filipino philosophy, instead of harping on a lost paradise, should instead harness its own intensity to critique, not retrieve, identity. This is the same strategy Deleuze himself learned from David Hume. Philosophy for both Hume and Deleuze does not begin from any notion of identity since identity is yet to be constituted. Here lies the radicalism of the empiricism of Hume. It is an empiricism that speaks of a world that is constantly slipping away from the grasp of the subject who pretends to know itself as well as the given. Hume’s empiricism overturns this belief since the given is in constant flux; the given is a mere succession of events, of a movement that never follows a single trajectory. The best that the subject can do is to believe and to invent, that is, to engage the unknown. The singular feat of Hume according to Deleuze is precisely in spelling out this problem: the problem of the subject constituting itself in the given when the given itself is not given to subject. It is in this sense that Hume becomes one of the primary sources of Deleuzean philosophy of difference. In this position, Hume himself is turning the triumvirate of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle upside down and is likewise radicalizing everything the likes of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Marx have to say after him. In Hume, Deleuze finds an exclamation point for his philosophy of difference and Filipino philosophy itself can find in it a veritable starting point. Filipino philosophy can turn to but cannot afford to dwell on history if it wishes to affirm itself. The challenge is to find an expression of newness, an exploration of becoming. In the words of Deleuze: “History today still designates only the set of conditions, however recent they may be, from which one turns away in order to become, that is to say, to create something new.”
Rizal originally thought of Filipino identity as a molar reality, as something that defined who we were and whose reclamation is indispensable in establishing a national community. Succeeding scholars pursued the same line of inspiration and as shown in the paper, early exponents of Filipino philosophy infused their workds with the same mindset. It was a philosophy anchored on nationalism which itself is fed by a memory of an identity, whole and intact, before it was deterritorialized by our European colonizers. As I argued in the paper, there is a need to re-visit Filipino philosophy since the very foundation from which it seeks legitimation is itself under question. Identity, says the Deleuze, is the very reason for the floundering of Western culture, the same damaged culture that we inherited from Europe with its alleged discovery of the Philippines. To be truly liberating, philosophy, Filipino or otherwise, must extricate itself from the domain of the Same, that is, from the realm of identity. The real matter for philosophy, in fact, the only matter, is the creation of concepts and according to Deleuze, concepts are created not by the sustaining what is but by provoking what can become. This is how Filipino philosophy can evoke difference.
Filipino scholars of philosophy can no longer hope to reclaim what has long been deterritorialized. This is not to say that native speculation has reached a dead end. The value of the philosophy of difference of Gilles Deleuze as an alternative language for Filipino philosophy lies precisely in its ability to indicate new directions and to inaugurate virgin passage ways that can help Filipino speculation more than just a regional philosophy but a genuine field of immanence where both Filipino and philosophy can become. To help us accomplish this goal, we are here proposing some Deleuzean concepts and how they may be applied in our pursuit of pushing the boundaries of Filipino philosohy ever wider.
First, identity is a molecular, not a molar, reality. Following Hume’s insight, Deleuze tells us that subjectivity is not something pregiven; it is in constant flux, an assemblage that is constantly constituted. From this perspective, we can read Rizal’s much mourned lost Filipino “identity” as a mere moment in a long episode of identity creation which continues until today. The Filipino is not a figure that once was and would have been forever until deterritorialized. The Filipino is a bundle of tales, a fusion of forces. There is no reason to exorcise ourselves of our colonial past in the hope of finding a nationality that is pure and untouched for the Filipino is a field of constant deterrritorializing and reterritorializing influences. To think that we can be Filipinos without the any colonial intervention is to betray the very history of the word “Filipino” itself. A Filipino speculation on philosophy can qualify as philosophy according to its capacity to create concepts that can elevate our understanding not just our ethnicity but moreso, the possibilities of our relational nature as human subjects. This notion acquires particular urgency especially in this age of massive Filipino diaspora and the postmodern blurring of the traditioal ethnic and cultural boundaries.
Second, Filipino philosophy should direct itself to becoming a minority. In the past, our native thinkers considered it Filipino when speculation is done in contrast to the Western systems of thought or when the vernacular is used as opposed to the colonial language. Deleuze would hesitate to call this mode of philosophizing different because, as it is, it remains stuck in the negative. Difference, as Deleuze would have it, is not celebration of negation but a festive announcement of affirmation. Filipino philosophy as a minority philosophy must not step back from a majority language or from a majority system of thought. What it should do instead is insert itself within them and from inside, discover new way of saying, new mode of thinking well beyond or even against the majority’s very own. Filipino philosophy can do this not only within philosophy itself but within other disciplines the way Deleuze interpreted the novels of Kafka, the paintings of Francis Bacon or French cinema.
Rizal’s hope was an experience of genuine becoming for every Filipino. An alternative Filipino philosophy using Deleuze is a corrective to the belief that such hope is lost and such hope is past. We are a people composed of singularities who continue to create and recreate ourselves from various social, cultural and historical intensities. As a philosophy of difference, Filipino philosophy is a narrative of our constant becoming. The principal task of Filipino philosophy is to resist not only the tendency to define itself according to the framework of ethnicity; it should in fact defy the very tendency towards definition. The task of philosophy, if we follow Deleuze, is to push the boundaries ever wider, to create spaces that will make possible the creation of new concepts. To use ethnicity to designate how we think and what we are thinking as Filipinos is to denigrate both philosophy and the Filipino by reducing them into metaphysical categories. It does not mean of course that the question as to what makes Filipinos Filipino should be set aside. On the contrary, the only way to give justice to this problem is to keep it open. Filipino philosophy, to become philosophical, must restrain itself from making conceptual prescriptions on questions that border on either philosophy and Filipino. Philosophy and Filipino – they are both singularities; they exceed identity. They can only become. Read through Deleuze, Filipino philosophy means philosophy becoming Filipino and Filipino becoming philosophy. What needs articulation is not identity but the creative process of engagement with a variety of forces which affect the singularities they both continuously become.
Umaabot na sa halos sampung milyon ang bilang ng mga Filipino na nagtratrabaho o naninirahan sa iba’t ibang bahagi ng mundo. Ang bilang na ito ay patuloy pa na nadadagdagan sa bawat libong umaalis ng bansa araw-araw. Mula pa noong dekada sitenta, nang isa-polisiya ng administrasyon ng dating pangulong Marcos ang paggawa bilang kalakal, naging mas madami at mas mabilis ang paglikas ng mga Filipino. Lalo itong umigting sa saglit na paglago ng pandaigdigang ekonomiya pagdating ng dekada nobenta. Maliban sa Amerika, paboritong hantungan ng karamihan sa atin ang Australia, Canada, New Zealand at Singapore. Ang mga estudyanteng pumapasok sa kolehiyo ngayon ay sa ibang bansa na nakapako ang mata hindi pa man nakakatapos. Kahit ang mga may trabaho na ay nagsisipagbitiw sa kani-kanilang opisina, eskwelahan, negosyo o pabrika para makipagsapalaran sa buhay sa ibang bansa. At kahit sino sa kanila ang tanungin kung ano ang nagudyok sa kanila upang mangapit-bansa, iisa ang sagot na maririnig sa kanila: hanap-buhay.
Pilipinas ang mundo ng mga Filipino o ang Da na tinatawag ni Heidegger. Dito nararanasan ng Filipino ang pagkakatapon sa kanya. Dito nagaganap ang kanyang pakikisangkot sa Meron. Subalit, batay sa nabanggit na, tila may kabalintunaan ang nangyayaring pakikisangkot ng marami. Pakikisangkot ito na nilalarawan ng pagtakas, ng paglikas. Pakikisangkot ng pagtanggi na ariin ang sariling pagkakatapon. Masisisi ba naman natin sila? Katwiran ng isang kaibigang umalis kamakailan lamang papuntang Vancouver, masyado na raw mahirap ang buhay sa Pilipinas. Pakaunti na raw nang pakaunti ang oportunidad para sa progreso at ito’y lalo pang nababawasan dahil sa katiwalian sa gobyerno. Malabis na rin daw ang paglaganap ng polusyon na tumalab na hindi lamang sa hangin kundi pati na rin sa tubig at sa lupa. Hindi na raw ligtas para sa mga anak niya ang manatili sa isang lugar na maaaring magdulot pa sa kanila ng malubhang karamdaman balang araw. Nakakabagabag na rin daw ang dalas at dami ng insidente ng krimen na dati’y sa mga panulukang madidilim lamang nangyayari; ngayon, tila nagiging karaniwang kaganapan na ito kahit sa loob ng mga tahanan at ang kriminal ay hindi na mga estranghero mula kung saan kung hindi mga taong kabilang sa pamilya.
Kaya nga para sa kanilang nakaalis na, ang kanilang pag-alis ay hindi pagtakas; hindi ito pagpiglas sa kanilang pagkakatapon. Udyok daw ito ng kanilang pagmemeron bilang mga Filipino. Tugon nila ito bilang Da-sein sa paanyaya ng sisilip-kukubling Meron. Bilang Da-sein, pananagutan nila sa kanilang sarili, sa sariling kanilang-kanila lamang, ang maghanap ng isang makakatotohanang pag-iral, ng isang buhay na marapat sa kanilang pagsisikap at mga inaasam. Kung ang Da-sein ay kinakatha ng kanyang sariling posibilidad, hindi niya maaaring talikuran ang tawag nito. Ang tanong na hinaharap ng isang Filipinong nagmemeron ay kung paano tutupadin ang mga posibilidad na ito sa harap ng maraming balakid na nakaharang sa kanya. Nais niyang umunlad; nais niyang matupad ang mga pangarap; nais niya ng mas matatag na kinabukasan ngunit matay man niyang isipin, mahirap maganap ang lahat ng ito habang siya ay nasa Pilipinas. Kung sinabi ni Heidegger na ang Da-sein ay naglalakbay patungo sa posibilidad, ayon sa kaibigan ko, mas ramdam niya na ang buhay niya dito sa Pilipinas ay patungo sa wala. Parang ganito rin ang binanggit ni Heidegger nang ipinanukala niya na ang buhay ng tao ay sadyang papunta sa wala, ibig sabihin, lahat tayo, lahat ng sa atin ay lilipas din. Gayunman, hindi ibig sabihin nito na ang ating pagsisikap maging ganap, maging totoo ay maaari nating ipagwalang bahala. Sa katunayan, dahil nga lahat ay lilipas din, mas mahigpit ang ating pangangailangan ng makapag-iwan ng lagda ng ating pagiral. Sa ganito naiiba ang pag-iral ng Da-sein; sa ganito rin siya mas nagiging ganap at totoo. Nakikisangkot ang Da-sein sa panahon at tinutugis ang kanyang posibilidad dahil nga batid niya na bukas makalawa ay wala na siya. Ang pagiging pansamantala mismo ng panahon ang naguudyok sa Da-sein na makilahok, na yakapin ang bawat sandali, na salubungin sa halip na hintayin lamang ang posibilidad na nabibilang sa kanya. Dahil dito, masasabi natin na sadyang may malapit na kaugnayan ang kalinga at bagabag. Ang kalinga ay tugon sa udyok ng posibilidad. Ito ay isang malikhaing pagtupad sa ating pagiging itinapon. Ang pagkalinga ay pagtalima ng Da-sein sa posibleng mangyari sa kanya. Nagpapamalas siya ng kalinga sapagkat naniniwala siya na mayroong mangyayari. Ang kalinga samakatwid ay nakatuon sa posibilidad at hindi sa isang teritoryong geograpikal. Kaya nga kung kinakailangang lisanin ng isang Filipino ang sariling bansa, ginagawa niya ito dahil itinapon ang Da-sein upang kalingain ang sariling posibilidad. Ang pagkatapon samakatwid sa Da-sein ay hindi nangangahulugan ng pagkakapinid sa bakuran ng isang bansa. Ang pagkatapon ng Da-sein ay pagiging laan sa iba’t ibang posibleng mangyari na tanging Da-sein lamang ang makakabatid sa paraang siya lamang ang makakahanap. Kung walang nangyayari at kung walang nakikita sa kanyang buhay, dito makakaramdam ng bagabag ang Da-sein. Nababagabag siya sapagkat nababanaag niya ang wala: walang pag-asa, walang pagkakataon, walang kinabukasan, walang pagbabago. Ang lahat ng ito ay pahiwatig ng wala. Ayon kay Heidegger, hindi natin nakikita ang wala mismo. Nababanaag lamang natin ito sa mga bagay-bagay na tila ba unti-unting humuhulagpos sa ating mga kamay o sa paligid na waring naglalaho sa ating paningin: sweldong ayaw tumaas, presyong ayaw bumaba, trapik na hindi malutas, kontratang hindi maisara. Sa ganito nagpapamalas ang wala. Sa harap nito, nababagabag ang Da-sein na baka walang mangyari. Dalawa ang kanyang posibleng maging tugon: pag-ibayuhin ang kalinga o kaya tuluyang masadlak sa buhay na karaniwan. Tinuturing ni Heidegger na karaniwan ang buhay na paulit-ulit; isang buhay na nakakulong sa sirkulo ng nakagawian na: natutulog, bumabangon, pumapasok, umuuwi, napapagod pagkatapos ay matutulog ulit, babangon ulit, papasok ulit, uuwi ulit, makakaramdam ulit ng pagod hanggang sa makatulog ulit at magpatuloy ang buhay na nakasanayan. Hindi ganito ang buhay ng Da-sein. Kung tutuusin, positibo pa ngang maituturing ang pagpaparamdam ng wala. Dahil dito, nauudyukan ang Da-sein na tumalima upang magpamalas ng kalinga. Silang nakaramdam ng udyok na ito, sila ang naglakas-loob na mangibang bayan upang hanapin ang buhay na mas totoo para sa kanila.
Ang hanap-buhay ng Pinoy samakatwid ay maaaring tingnan sa dalawang lebel. Una, sa lebel na ontik, ibig sabihin, sa lebel ng karaniwan nating pagkaunawa kung ano ang hanap-buhay – walang iba kundi ang paghahanap ng ikabubuhay. Sa ordinaryong karanasan, ang paghahanap ng ikabubuhay ay bahagi ng ating pagtanggap sa mundo bilang mundo at sa ating tadhana bilang itinapon. Nagugutom tayo kaya kailangang kumain; nabibilad sa araw kaya kailangan ng silungan; nangangarap kaya kailangang mag-aral. Lahat ng ito ay kailangang tustusan ng salapi kaya malaking bagay sa kahit sino man na magkaroon ng permanente at maayos na hanap-buhay. Ang hanap-buhay sa ontik na pagkaunawa ang nagbibigay ng materyal na katiyakan sa pagmemeron ng tao.
Maliban dito, may isa pang kahulugan ang hanapbuhay; ang hanap-buhay sa ontolohikal na kahulugan. Ibig sabihin nito, ang paghahanap ng buhay na makabuluhan at may pinaglalaanan. Ang ontolohikal na hanap-buhay ay higit pa sa trabaho. May mga taong kumikita ng malaking salapi subalit nananatiling salat sa loob dahil hindi pa nila nasusumpungan ang buhay na totoo para sa kanila. Marami sa ating mga kababayan na nakaalis na at matagal nang naninirahan sa ibang bansa ngunit hanggang ngayo’y waring dayuhan pa rin sa kanilang sarili sapagkat bagamat nakatuntong na sila sa lugar na kanilang gustong puntahan, ramdam nila na mayroon silang hindi pa nararating. Sa gitna ng akala nilang katuparan ng kanilang pangarap, naroon pa rin ang pakiramdam na hanggang ngayon tila ba sila’y namamamahay pa rin.
Sa isang banda, tila mas mahirap pa ang kanilang kalagayan kaysa sa mga taong naiwan dito sa Pilipinas. Oo nga’t mahirap ang buhay dito; oo nga’t salat sa maraming bagay subalit parang mas malalim ang hiwa sa loob nilang nandayuhan sa ibang bansa. Bagamat walang bansa ang Meron at ang pagkatapon sa atin ay walang pinipiling rehiyon, hindi rin naman maikakaila ang malaking kaugnayan ng mundong pumapaligid sa atin at sa ating totoong pag-iral. Ito ang dahilan kung bakit para kay Heidegger, walang anomang lugar na maglalapit sa kanya sa Meron kundi ang Alemanya sampu ng kanyang tula, ng kanyang kasaysayan, ng kanyang mga awitin, maging ng kanyang mga kagubatan at kapatagan. Gayunman, hindi nangangahulugan na mas malapit sa Meron silang hindi nangibang bayan at nagpaiwan dito sa Pilipinas. May kani-kanyang lakbay ang bawat isa at sa kanila, iba-iba rin ang pagdanas ng Meron. Ang tanging pagkakatulad ng Pinoy sa isa’t isa, mangibang bayan man o dito manirahan, ay ang bagay na lahat sila ay naghahanap-buhay: nagnanais kumita at naghahangad makakita. May malaking pagkakaiba ang malaking sweldo sa ibang bansa at ang pagtitiis sa kakaunti dito sa Pilipinas subalit alin man sa kanila’y maaaring maging daan papalapit o papalayo sa Meron. Kung tunay na mayroong pilosopiyang Filipino, dito dapat magsimula ang kanyang salaysay – sa penomenolohiya ng hanap-buhay ng Pinoy.
After successfully pinning down the discrepancies in Renato Corona’s SALN (statement of assets, liabilities and net worth), the House prosecution panel quickly switched to a higher gear and aimed its sight at its next target: Corona’s dollar accounts. The move was deflected however by Pascual Garcia, president of the Philippine Savings Bank, who testified that the said accounts were untouchable by virtue of the bank secrecy law. His position sat well with the defense but constrained the prosecution. To buttress its position, PS Bank went to the Supreme Court and prayed for a TRO. The Supreme Court acceded to its plea, effectively curbing albeit momentarily any attempt to make Corona account for his dollar accounts. The Senate found itself in a bind when it confronted the question whether or not it should abide by the Supreme Court’s order. On one hand, it is acknowledged that the Supreme Court is the final authority on questions of law; on the other hand, the Senate is assured by the Constitution paramount and sole power as impeachment court. Overnight, the Senate which handles the impeachment trial suddenly becomes the subject on trial, that is, on trial before the public eye. Viewers of the impeachment hang on for the Senate’s decision. In the end, with a vote of 13 against 10, the Senate deferred to the Supreme Court in a gesture perceived by some as a calibrated response to avert a possible constitutional crisis and at the same time, to preserve the Senate’s image as custodian of the rule of the law. The majority chose to sustain “absolute confidentiality” of Corona’s dollar accounts over the matter of absolute accountability for which he is being tried.
The stance of the majority jibes with that of the defense and is patent among lawyers. Most lawyers share the same tendency to reduce a question of justice to a question of law and a question of law to a question of the text of the law. In a recent column, Professor Randy David (Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 18, 2012) referred to this as the lawyers’ Umwelt, the ability to read the world, for better or for worse, as their vistas dictate. Oftentimes however, such vista is conditioned by a dogged idolatry of the text even if it stands against public reason. They adhere to the facticity of law blindly and conceal the infirmities of their arguments by spewing Latin phrases, conjunctions, adverbs and legal citations meant not to uncover the truth but to throw their hearers off balance. Sometimes, we become unwitting victims of this verbal exhibitionism when we assent to a point they make however far it is from common sense. In a memorable scene towards the end of the movie “Devil’s Advocate”, Kevin Lomax (Keanu Reeves) confronted John Milton (Al Pacino), the devil incarnate, and asked him why he chose lawyers to be his surrogates. Milton explained: “Law is the ultimate backstage pass. There are now more students in law schools than lawyers walking the streets.” The movie of course is fictive but it does tell us how law and lawyers may be drawn into the dark side.
Given the situation, the people remain vigilant and critical. Optimism is strong for the senator-judges to be discerning enough to see through the fortifications of technicalities the defense lawyers have erected in order to blur perception of Corona’s guilt. We can’t blame them though; they were recruited and paid to do that dirty job and by the looks of it, Renato Corona is getting every ounce of his penny’s worth. His lawyers’ gift of judicial gab never fails to wow the impeachment audience. Added to this, he has likewise firewalled himself through a memorandum enforcing confidentiality of records of Supreme Court justices and another instruction barring any Supreme Court personnel from testifying at the impeachment trial. He has also filed a motion asking the Supreme Court to stop the ongoing impeachment. And now this, a help from thirteen senators – the sheer number of them leaves a bad taste in the mouth.
It was a fortress Corona built for his defense; law after all is his turf. Had he shown the same readiness for defense as a graduate student, he would have legitimized his doctoral degree with a dissertation. Had he chosen to be just rather than a justice, he would have been truly honorable. Had he known ethics better than law, he would have not cowered behind judicial cloak. Had he upheld accountability rather than his accounts, he would have restored respect for public office.
He has not done, has never been any of those. Corona sucks up to a faded Glory whose legacy now weighs him down like a monstrous crown of ignominy.
At the University of Santo Tomas, Logic is offered to freshmen as their preparatory, if not their only, course in Philosophy. Logic is one of the legacies of Aristotle to the humanities and during the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas, in his works like Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles, adopted it and displayed how it can help promote discourse rather than discord. Where he disagreed with his interlocutors, Aquinas remained steadfast in his position but he was ready to understand theirs. In the contest of their ideas, a meeting point is reached and from such encounter, a new idea is born.
This appreciation of Logic is lost on our students today. They think that Logic sounds like “magic” and breeds moods that are “toxic” and “lethargic.” A minute after they are told that Logic introduces them into the life of the mind, they drift away into impenetrable regions. Their bodies are present; their eyes locked on the professor but nothing simply registers. Like passengers waiting for their flight, the classroom for them is simply a waiting lounge.
Students no longer get excited by the matters of the mind unless they come with visuals. They have grown dependent on colors and animation to jump-start their brain. They have zero appetite and below zero tolerance for pure discourse. Lecture for them is just “talk” without realizing that “talk” is what the school is for. Talk is a privilege of the academe, particularly the discipline of humanities for which talk is not mere trade of words but an exchange of minds. In ancient Greek, young people go to the Lyceum or the Academy for a talk fest. Plato himself built his reputation as a philosopher through a book on talk, the Dialogues, where he immortalized Socrates’ legacy of talking about philosophy in the streets and households of Athens. John Henry Newman, author of the classic The Idea Of A University, said that given a choice between a school where students routinely take exams and another where students can freely talk, he would gladly choose the latter. When people talk, they take a journey together. Such journey is the itinerary of new ideas. It is this kind of talk that our students miss.
Observers think that media and internet technology are partly to blame for this intellectual decadence . Not only do they diminish what is left of our students’ fragile attention span, they have also made them averse to anything that requires mental work. The general interests of the young are things and faces because they lend themselves out easily. They steer clear of issues and when pressed to comment about them, they would mouth the same opinions peddled by the broadcast, print and electronic media. They expend little effort in sourcing and sorting out facts; Google will do that for them. They think with and follow the lead of their fingers. The world has truly become digital – it is a world run by digits. The word “digit” stems from the Latin term digitus which means finger, the most powerful part of human anatomy today. With few finger actions, people can trot the globe, devise and revise identities, play hoops with NBA stars, wage war and conquer a whole army aided by the most compact weapon of mass distraction – the mouse.
The catchwords of the present generation are control and speed. Control is an illusion supplied by computer technology. With the help of computer applications, their users acquire illusory mastery when they complete a task with the slightest effort and minimal time. Mastery in the sense of excellence through repetitive and rigorous work has been relegated to a few movements of fingers. With the advent of recent innovations, even these finger motions have been minimized to more minor actions of tapping of or touching the screen. With the curtailment of human engagement and increasing dependence on gadgets, this sense of mastery becomes all the more deceitful. “Smart” and “intelligent” are descriptions that are used now for gadgets rather their users. People buy and use them to compensate in areas where they deem themselves inadequate.
Speed is kin to control; it is the illusory mastery in full action. People get a certain high when they are able to manipulate or as they say, manage time. They try to multiply, compress, slice time in order to “have” more time. Ironically, the more people try to take over time, the more they feel there is little of it. There are those who text while driving and all the while, are thinking of chores waiting at home. And when they are at it, their minds migrate to other tasks in the office on to another schedule for the next weekend. They are obsessed with catching up with the time they wish they have at the expense of the time already theirs. Maybe because we really cannot “have” time; time is not a commodity we can possess. We can only experience time when we slow down and dwell on it – by paying attention, by keeping still, by living the moment.
Thinking provides us the occasion for this. We need to think because, to paraphrase Plato, life, if unexamined, is a life in fragments. What we see we see more clearly when they are given a thought. That is how we become more human and our life, to quote Plato again, worth living. People who have been used to living life in the fast lane are merely skimming through life’s outer layer. They are bound to miss the best things which, like the best sights, are tucked away in secret places. Contrary to popular view, thinking is not an idle work nor is it a misuse of time. Thomas Aquinas showed us how thinking can be a pious engagement. There is indeed a certain degree of piety in thinking, the kind of piety that comes with seeing the interconnectedness of things. The ancient Greeks referred to this as kosmos, that is, the order and harmony that brings the world together. It should be said that such interconnectedness does not exhibit itself easily like a red ribbon on a white box. It is something that comes to us only when engaged with the mind. Unlike the interconnectivity of technology that fuels the illusion of speed and control, such interconnectedness moves as though in play in a slow dance of thought. Kosmos inspires wonder whose glimmer, even the faintest, animates the life of the mind.
The conventional image of a philosopher projects him as an anti-amorous type, his vocabulary too bland for pick-up lines, his build a structure mourned by testosterone. The public mind thinks of him as an old man given to lonely afternoon walks (Kant) or an absent-minded fellow prone to accidental fall (Thales) or a nonchalant easily swept by flights of abstraction even over a royal dinner (Aquinas). Philosophers too have been subjects of sour romantic tales. Socrates never hid his unhappy marriage. Kierkegaard’s engagement with Regina Olsen was a classic case of failure to launch. Abelard won Heloise’s heart but lost his vital part. Heidegger and Arendt found union in Being but had to endure the anxiety of thrownness in lives they had to live separately. De Beauvior and Sartre declared their union open and found themselves walled in by the free spaces of an affair that has no borders nor territories.
Despite such calamitous love stories, it is unfair to think of philosophers as strangers to love. The sweet irony is that love is one thing that philosophers know most. To begin with, theirs alone is the craft that gives the privilege over the title lover. Think of Thales and the mornings and afternoons he might have spent in the coasts of Miletus and how he soaked up the saline breeze and the expanse of the sea, leading him to think that everything begins and ends with water. It was love at first sight: the vista of the Aegean that shines in blue and how it can be both familiar and strange, known and unknown at the same time. Philosophy, as we interpret Thales, is to plunge into the sea and rip its surface only to realize that it is what holds us, its depth and breadth beyond us. Such experience opens up to love, not the mushy, saccharine type but the one that grants us fresh eyes to look at the same differently. As TS Eliot wrote in Little Gidding: We shall not cease from exploration / And the end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time. Philosophy was born from the bosom of love – love in the mode of yearning, love in the act of searching, love in the flow of wanting more. Boethius would turn to this kind of love for consolation in the cold and dark isolation of his prison cell, the love which he and Dante much later would call Lady Philosophy. In the words of Dante: Here we must recall what was said above, namely, that love is the form of Philosophy, and therefore is here called her soul.
A philosopher always finds himself in medias res, somewhere between the memory and anticipation of what is loved. He is a pilgrim, a wanderer in search of home but home for him is not a permanent residence nor a location with fixed address. Home, for a philosopher, is the event of getting there where there is not a stationary destination but, in the words of Hemingway, a moveable feast. The philosopher’s homecoming is always marked by a sorrow-blended joy and a joy-blended sorrow because home is always somewhere else. It has vanished from where it was just when the philosopher thought he has arrived. Home is the constant departing to the philosopher’s constant coming, hence the enduring space between the two. Such space is the continuum of desire and philosophy is its language. Like the gap between rain drops or the chasm between islands, that space is not meant to be extinguished because the distance that sets the philosopher apart from home is the only path that will bring him near it.
This distance is the site of movement towards the loved. In the dialogue Lysis, Plato equates distance with desire, a kind of emptiness which engenders the philosopher. “And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or men, are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom who are ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant person is a lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the misfortune to be ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do not know: and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad.”
Love known to philosophers is a rapture of desire, a desire that does not sit still in waiting but one that keeps watch during the night and braves the heat of noontime in pursuit of the loved. It is a love that feeds on desiring but whose fulfillment is always deferred because the object of desire cannot be held nor seized with certainty; one can only come near it in the act of desiring. Within a philosopher is a vast universe where desire extends to boundaries undefined. It is the cradle of his imaginings, his meanderings, his peregrinations. In desire, what is loved is seen as constantly on its way, always a step closer but ever farther away and in each moment, desire rises in degrees. And so the philosopher moves on and journeys through its course: to ancient caves, to dark caverns, to market places, to temple areas, to country homes, to inner rooms. There is never a place nor a time where the philosopher takes a day off from desire. In his heart, love of wisdom is a lifetime valentine.
(The following is an excerpt of a paper delivered at a colloquium at the University of Santo Tomas.)
The academia and pursuit of wealth are strange bedfellows and stranger still is the situation where wealth dictates the university agenda. While the university fosters “life of the mind” and shared understanding through research, instruction and symposia, pursuit of wealth engenders individualism and alienation. There should be then that space to protect the university against the tendencies to turn it into a “professional school”, that is, as a preparatory institution for feeding the needs of the professions. Hans-Georg Gadamer explains: “The word, education, signified a distancing from everything profitable and useful. In its elevated sense, the ‘science, which has not yet been completely discovered’, means, ‘living with ideas.’ This should unify the youth at the university and is intended to disclose through knowledge the horizon for all of reality and thereby also to open the possibility of surpassing this reality.” In other words, the purpose of the university is not just to create doctors, lawyers and architects but to imbue the same doctors, lawyers and architects with the spirit and the mind that will enable them to take on complex issues, to engage in constructive deliberation of pressing matters, to critique their own positions and be respectful of others’, to make their own prudent judgment. University education is meant, in other words, to transform the individual in those future doctors, lawyers and architects into members of society who can work well with teachers, engineers, clergy, jeepney drivers, market vendors and other members of the polis for the sake of the common good. The world of practical life is inherently fragmented, a perpetual “state of war” to use the description of Thomas Hobbes. The university therefore cannot concede its “solitude and freedom” to this state of affairs by becoming its mere subsystem. The university cannot afford to disintegrate into an institution of “many specialties” all in the name of the profitable.
The task of breeding this solidarity, this sense of community, this spirit of universality belongs to philosophy particularly in an age when the former is becoming more and more a rarity. One cannot overemphasize the teaching of philosophy in all levels of formal education. To begin with, philosophy belongs to our nature as human beings. Aristotle introduced his monumental work Metaphysics by saying that “all animals except man live by what they perceive and by memories but have little experience; whereas the human race lives also by art and reasoning.” This led Newman to remark that we are all “Aristotelians” by nature. By this Newman means that the very fact of our humanity compels us to think correctly and it is this natural rational inclination that must be enhanced by formal education at the university level. The recent UNESCO publication entitled Philosophy: A School of Freedom, discusses the necessity and significance of teaching philosophy in all levels of education, from basic, to secondary, to the university level. UNESCO, in the said document, tells us that teaching of philosophy in the university level ought not to be seen as mere “doctrinal training” on any philosophical system. A genuine philosophical education “aims to help individuals understand the complexity of experience. It also teaches us to critically consider established opinions, whether ours or those of others, and to criticize the motivations and intentions behind them and their effects. A philosophical education is a fundamental communication mechanism, because it is precisely by virtue of its critical range that we learn to see in another’s world view not the expression of a particular and foreign subjectivity but a partner in a shared human interaction, with whom it is possible to have productive exchanges and dialogue.” Teaching philosophy therefore is not just teaching another discipline; it is teaching rather a discipline of the mind that will enable an individual to navigate his way through the labyrinthine paths of human life simulated in the university. If life is a game, it can compare probably with a giant connect-the-dots and philosophy is that instrument that helps us trace and see what otherwise are dots in disarray hiding the intricate yet intimate pattern of our human existence.
What does it mean to be a university in the global age? And how can the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas help University of Santo Tomas assert its identity?, I then say that to be a university in the global age is to be that sphere whose members freely engage in their common pursuit for a shared search and understanding of truth. Thomas himself would say in De Magistro, we are able to “discover” truth only if we allow others to help us. This commonality which the university fosters is an important element for the transformation of its students into responsible global citizens, that is, as individuals who see each other as members of the same human community, aspirants of the same fulfilling end and partakers of the same human experience that characterize our common finitude. The university, therefore, cannot dispense with the humanities in general and philosophy in particular, if it wishes to assert its identity in the global age for these are the very disciplines that will help its students discover what defines them as human persons. It is through the cultivation of sympathy and the nurturing of philosophical mind that the university can help deter the alienation engendered by unhampered consumerist culture and uncritical utilization of science and technology characteristic of the global age. In its celebration of its fourth centenary, the University of Santo Tomas defines its birthright and destiny in terms of building the church, the nation and family. This is to say that to be a university means to be a living summa, a place that gathers fellow pilgrims in search of that common fiber woven through the layers of differences in our individual lives. As a university, UST is our alma mater, the breeding ground from which our sense of humanity acquires its soul.
Philosophy is a government-mandated course in Brazil. Not only is it a mandated course, the law requires it for all high school students. So even before they take up philosophy in college, Brazilian high school students have had three-years worth of studying philosophy.
I read this interesting fact from Carlos Fraenkel’s article “Citizen Philosophers: Teaching Justice in Brazil” published in the January/February 2012 online issue of the Boston Review. The webpage said that the article will be part of Fraenkel’s forthcoming book entitled Teaching Plato in Palestine. The bottomline, as written by Fraenkel, is that the government believes philosophy is crucial in propagating citizenship education. Brazil believes that its citizens will be better off when they are able to think critically, to form well-reasoned judgments, to be conversant in social and political issues and to be engaged in the pursuit of justice through the discipline that philosophy provides them. The program has had its own of critics but one cannot deny the overwhelming support it enjoys particularly from the economically-challenged sector of Brazilian society.
Those among us who grew up in the 80’s will probably remember how it was for Brazil during those years. Like the Philippines, it also suffered under an oppressive regime, the economy was bankcrupt, poverty rate was at rock bottom and peace and order situation always threatened the country with collapse. Like the Philippines, Brazil was also able to shake off the dictatorship which used to rule it but unlike the Philippines, it has outgrown by lightyears the poverty and instability of the past. Brazil is part now of the so-called G20, an informal alignment of the top 20 economies worldwide. Global rankings have always given Brazil the highest rating in terms of human development, governance, education and employment. As an exclaimation point to what it has achieved, Brazil was recently likewise bestowed the honor of hosting of two major global events: the World Cup in 2014 and the Summer Olympics in 2016.
This is Brazil. What we find at the other side of the continent, in Northern America, is exactly the opposite. In the same Boston Review, published on its April 5, 2011 issue, Todd Edwin Jones, Chair of the Department of Philosophy of University of Las Vegas, Nevada, decried in his article “Budgetary Hemlock: Nevada Seeks To Eliminate Philosophy” the university decision to phase out the entire philosophy deparment of ULVN due to budget cuts. This is no isolated event. British philosopher AC Grayling of University of London and Oxford University established his own College of Humanities in the face of the same funding reduction for humanities imposed by the administration of David Cameron. We find here a rather curious juxtaposition between philosophy and economy. Societies on the rise are more friendly with philosophy. Societies in decline are the ones who think it is superflous. Have they lost love of wisdom due to societal decline? Or does the society decline because it has ceased loving wisdom long ago? We must remember that Athens fell not because of Socrates’ death. Socrates died because Athens has lost her moorings and the only tragic consolation it could afford was the death of the one who cared for her the most.
These things come to mind in the light of K+12 being contemplated by the Philippine government and its possible repercussions on university education in general and philosophy in particular. The UST Department of Philosophy is optimistic that the first university in Asia which created the first ever philosophy program the same year it was founded will not be the first to turn its back on philosophy.